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Abstract 
Israel is a country uniquely affected by demography, insofar as the 
state is bound by an explicitly Jewish nature. This balance has forced 
Israel to combat external demographic threats from before 1948 up 
until the present. The implementation of policies including the 
endorsement of “transfer”—a euphemism for the expulsion of 
Palestinians in 1948, the razing of Palestinian villages, discriminatory 
legislation and the creation of facts on the ground—are a logical 
extension of the Zionist ideology. The construction of the West Bank 
Barrier (WBB) is the current manifestation of Israeli demographic 
fears and the Zionist desire to further curb non-Jewish elements. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, Israeli domestic policy has been directed in large part 
by demographic concerns and a fixation on the occupied Palestinian 
population growth. This preoccupation with issues of demography is 
not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, the state of Israel was born out of a 
desire to establish “a publicly and legally secured home in Palestine for 
the Jewish people”—the Zionist prime objective (Morris 1987: 1). 
However much the “land without a people for a people without a land” 
stoked the nationalist sentiments of post-war European Jewry, there 
were people living in Palestine, and in substantive numbers. Thus, from 
the very roots of Zionist thought, beginning with the “prophetic-
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programmatic” writings of Moses Hess, Judah Alkalai, Zvi Hirsch 
Kalischer and Theodor Herzl, it was acknowledged that for a Jewish 
state to emerge in Palestine, the resident Arab population would have to 
become a minority or be removed altogether (Morris 1987: 4). This 
article examines the political importance of demography to Zionist 
ideology and the imperative to protect Israel’s Jewish nature. To do so, 
I will first review Israel’s necessary regulation of demography towards 
achieving Zionist goals by briefly summarizing the importance of 
transfer to Zionist political thought.1 Armed with this knowledge, I then 
address Israel’s practice of establishing “facts on the ground,” the 
modern continuation of which is the fait accompli existence of the West 
Bank Barrier (WBB). Finally, by reviewing Israel’s constant evasion of 
seriously addressing the demographic question, I intend to draw a 
logical parallel between past actions designed to establish a Jewish 
majority and the physical reality of the WBB aimed at keeping it. 
Though Israel has consistently denied political motives, this article 
attempts to map the WBB’s actual political implications within a 
historical framework.2 
                                       
1
 Those familiar with issues of Israel/Palestine are well acquainted with the top scholars 
in the field, not least of which include Benny Morris, Nur Masalha, Ilan Pappe among 
others. These scholars belong to what has since been called the “new historian” 
movement, instigated by the declassification of Israeli military archives in the 1980s, and 
their work has since helped to dispel a great deal of confusion and pseudo-academic 
posturing as to the events of 1948. Unless otherwise cited, all historical documentation in 
this article relies on the work of these historians and, to a lesser extent, my own time 
working in the Gaza Strip. 
2
 This article does not discuss the implications of Hamas’ rise to power in 2006, the 2007 
U.S.-backed coup attempt, the unfolding economic crisis in Gaza, or the ongoing Israeli 
siege of the territory. These are all critical aspects of the situation in the Palestinian 
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DEMOGRAPHY AND THE ZIONIST IMPERATIVE 
 
To understand the importance of demography to mainstream Zionist 
worldview, we must review the four basic tenets of the cause.3 The first 
principle of pre-1948 Zionism was the desire to establish a “territorial 
concentration of the Jewish people in Palestine” (Gorny 1987: 2). This 
principle assumed a Jewish majority, for Zionism itself was at least 
partly born in response to the vulnerability of the European Jewry to 
anti-Semitism during the 20th century. Naturally, the second principle 
sought to create a Jewish majority in Palestine, without which 
“Zionism would [have forfeited] its meaning” by (once again) existing 
as a minority in a land governed by an alien power (Gorny 1987: 2). 
The third principle dealt with Jewish labor and the strongly nationalist 
fantasies of Jews tilling Jewish land; it was believed that the practice of 
employing exclusively Jewish labor would aid Zionist economic 
independence. The fourth principle, driven by fears of cultural 
assimilation during the Diaspora, sought to promote a rebirth of 
Hebrew culture, which was very effectively executed later on. The first 
of these causes is entirely dependent upon demography (i.e. a Jewish 
majority) and the third and forth, though not dependent upon, are more 
feasible with such a majority. Thus, demography is the single unifying 
                                                                                                                  
territories, but are not (in my opinion), of immediate relevance to the Zionist 
demographic imperative. 
3
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the historical/political emergence of 
Zionism and I take it for granted that my readers are familiar with this topic. If not, there 
is an abundance of material on the matter including many of the sources I cite in this 
article. 
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factor under which Zionism has flourished. It is for this reason that 
demographic issues have taken precedence above other Zionist goals, 
often limiting Israel’s ability to universally guarantee citizens’ rights as 
members of a liberal democracy.4 
 
As the supreme goal of Zionism, the establishment of a Jewish majority 
in Palestine necessitated a solitary outcome: the erstwhile Arab 
majority needed to become a minority—as small a minority as possible. 
In this way, the notion of transfer was married to Zionist thought 
almost from its inception (Masalha, 1992; Morris 2004; Pappe 2006). 
Not merely a cause relegated to the far right Revisionists, transfer 
policies were endorsed by all echelons of the Zionist political sphere 
prior to 1948. As David Ben-Gurion wrote in a letter to his son, “We 
must expel [the] Arabs and take their places…to guarantee our own 
right to settle in those places…” (David Ben-Gurion cited in Teveth, 
1985: 189). The demographic imperatives of Zionism necessitated the 
removal of Palestinian Arabs from the future Jewish state and any 
right-minded proponent of the cause could not have desired a lesser 
alternative. Any debate at all was reserved merely for the practicalities 
of implementation and the possibility of voluntary, as opposed to 
forcible, transfer of Palestine’s Arab population (see Masalha, 1992; 
                                       
4
 For example, Israel has adopted many laws aimed at controlling demography, most 
notably the Law of Return and various marriage laws to restrict the rights of Israeli’s 
married to non-Jews. Numerous studies have also found Israel’s Arab population to be 
effectively marginalized with difficult access to public services, decent schools, and 
higher rates of criminal incarceration. 
IJIS Volume 5
60
KRISTOFER J. PETERSEN-OVERTON – COUNTING HEADS 
 
 
 
Pappe, 2006).5 According to Rabbi Meir, a member of the Yishuv 
National Council, “The basis of Zionism is that the land of Israel is 
ours and not the land of the Arabs, and not because they have large 
territories, and we have but little. We demand Palestine because it is 
our country” (Meir cited in Gorny, 1987: 86). More recently, Ariel 
Sharon stated, “…there is no Zionism, colonialization, or Jewish State 
without the eviction of the Arabs and the expropriation of their lands” 
(Al Jazeera, 2006). The question of demography is of central 
importance to Zionism and I submit that it is possible to trace this 
importance from the realization of Zionist goals and policy through the 
20th century up to the construction of the WBB.  
“TRANSFER” PRIOR TO 1948 
 
In 1948, three-quarters of a million people suddenly became the 
Palestinian refugee problem, most having left their homes after a 
combination of psychological “whispering” campaigns and direct 
military assault by Jewish forces long before Israel’s declaration of 
independence and the subsequent invasion of Arab armies (Morris, 
1987; Masalha, 1992; Pappe 2006). Despite decades of official denial 
on behalf of successive Israeli governments, it is no longer disputed 
that the 1948 refugees were largely a product of Israeli eviction by 
                                       
5
 Even Moshe Sharett (Shertok), a prominent member of the Yishuv at the time, and by 
all accounts the most sympathetic to Palestinian rights, expressed support for the 
voluntary transfer of Palestine’s Arab population to neighboring Transjordan. Indeed, the 
option of coexistence was never discussed as a serious option by any among the Zionist 
leadership. 
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conquest and that transfer policies were long endorsed by Israel’s 
proto-Zionist founders (See Masalha, 1992 and Morris, 2002).  
 
It is not clear precisely how these events were endorsed by policy and 
the debate over intentional or incidental Palestinian expulsion 
continues.6 The classic Zionist narrative argues that the result of 1948 
was a “miraculous clearing of the land”, which happened to be 
organized by the Palestinian leadership. Such an explanation would 
seem to absolve Israel of responsibility and “leave intact [Israel’s] 
untarnished image as the haven of a much persecuted people, a body 
politic more just, moral and deserving of the West’s sympathy and help 
than the surrounding sea of reactionary, semi-feudal, dictatorial Arab 
societies” (Morris, 1987: 1). While many Israelis may be willing to 
accept that transfer policies were widely endorsed in theory by the 
Yishuv, it is more difficult for them to imagine these beliefs translating 
into the 1948 exodus as a premeditated and intentional expulsion.7 This 
is precisely where Nur Masalha diverges from Benny Morris. Morris 
famously concluded, “the Palestine refugee problem was born of war 
and not by design” (Morris, 1987: 286), yet Masalha found the same 
evidence to suggest deliberate dispossession. Both historians work 
                                       
6
 Most of this debate is relegated to simple disputes over the number of Palestinian 
expelled by force as opposed to the number having fled the region as refugees. As we 
now know, “Plan Dalet”, enforced by Jewish forces as early as late 1947, called for the 
total destruction of Palestinian villages and the expulsion of residents beyond the borders 
of the future state. 
7
 It is telling that the key figures in this ongoing debate are two of the very scholars I cite 
in this article: Benny Morris and Ilan Pappe. 
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from the same factual basis, but there are still disputes over the 
Yishuv’s depth of practical commitment to removing hundreds of 
thousands of Arabs from Palestine. Whether premeditated or 
coincidental, most contemporary Zionists tend to agree that Israel 
benefited greatly from the sudden absence of Palestinian Arabs in 
1948; indeed, the almost total realization of Zionism’s demographic 
goals had ensured Israel’s very existence.8 
 
Before 1930, the Zionist leadership had kept its aspirations for transfer 
relatively quiet, due to the understandable alarm it roused in the 
Palestinian population. Despite the necessity of transfer to Zionist 
goals, it was virtually taboo for the leadership to discuss such plans 
publicly. The early 1930s witnessed a surge in Zionist confidence, 
however, as Jewish immigration increased from 17.8% to 29.5% 
(Khalidi, 1991: 86). Thus, plans advocating the transfer of Palestinian 
Arabs surfaced more frequently than before. Menahem Ussishkin, then-
President of the Jewish National Fund, remarked at a meeting with the 
Jewish Agency Executive: 
 
“What we can demand today is that all Transjordan be included 
within the Land of Israel … on condition that Transjordan would 
either be made available for Jewish colonization or for the 
resettlement of those Arabs, whose lands [in Palestine] we would 
purchase ... I will fight for this. I will make sure that we will be the 
                                       
8
 Benny Morris for example, has argued that Israel would have been able to avoid much 
of the violence that has plagued its existence over the years if the Yishuv had managed to 
expel all of Palestine’s Arab population in 1947/48.  
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landlords of this land … because my country belongs to us and not 
to them…” (Ussishkin cited in Masalha, 1992: 51) 
 
Ussishkin was not alone. Many members of the Zionist leadership 
assumed that if the Palestinian Arabs refused to relocate to Iraq, 
Transjordan would be the natural compromise so long as the possibility 
for Jewish settlement remained an option. The plan rested on the naïve 
assumption that Palestinian land-attachment was superficial and 
relocation to Transjordan would have been unobjectionable—a strange 
logic that was adopted principally as an apology for population transfer 
plans at the time.9 By stressing the belief that Palestinian Arabs looked 
upon Transjordan with equal favor as they did Palestine, the Yishuv 
was able to rationalize a (somewhat) morally defensible case for 
dispossession and expulsion. Certainly, transfer would have solved the 
“Arab problem”. As it became clear that only military force would 
compel the Palestinians to resettle in Iraq, most accepted Transjordan 
as the eventual destination for Arab transferees, though many still 
pushed for Iraq.10 
 
In 1937, the partition of Palestine offered by the Royal Peel 
Commission would have effectively barred Jewish settlers from 
Transjordan and too much reflected the stark Arab majority in the 
                                       
9
 It should be noted that all references to transfer were decidedly euphemistic during this 
period. 
10
 Iraq as a transfer destination, though abandoned by the Mapai party and other 
mainstream Zionists, continued to be pushed by the far right and those who feared the 
unnecessary hindrance of future Jewish settlement in the region. 
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region. “Thus, the notion of transfer was a natural concomitant to the 
partition idea” (Masalha, 1992: 55). Also, though Arab nationalism was 
slow to emerge as a unified force, most Palestinians were individually 
loath to cede any of what they considered to be their land. Thus, when 
the Royal Peel Commission issued its proposal for a two-state partition, 
neither the Zionists nor the Palestinians could have unconditionally 
offered their support. Indeed, the recommendations, which ultimately 
offered the Yishuv about one-third of Palestine (including the most 
fertile regions) were rejected by the Palestinians and only intensified 
the ongoing Arab rebellion. The Yishuv accepted the Peel 
recommendations only after much hesitation—primarily because the 
commission endorsed compulsory transfer for the Arab population. Not 
all were pleased, however. Denouncing the Peel recommendations, 
Menahem Ussishkin declared, “We demand that our inheritance, 
Palestine, be returned to us and if there is no room for Arabs, they have 
the opportunity of going to Iraq” (Ussishkin, 1937: 3). It was clear that, 
despite the Yishuv's acceptance of partition, land negotiation—
including Transjordan—would continue; Zionism required it.  
 
By 1947, when the United Nations general assembly voted in favor of 
partition, the Zionists had been able to negotiate a Jewish state up to 
approximately half of Palestine. Jewish land-ownership surpassed 50% 
in only a handful of these regions however, so plans for Arab transfer 
had never fallen from popular approval. The subsequent “whispering” 
propaganda campaign and the direct military assault upon Palestinian 
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Arabs in 1948 has been excruciatingly well documented and I will 
avoid reviewing the chronology of various military operations. With 
the flight or expulsion of approximately 700,000 Palestinians, it is 
certain that Zionism’s goals were fulfilled to an extent unimaginable by 
many at the time. Chaim Weizmann declared the Palestinian exodus to 
be “miraculous,” and though such sensationalism was not entirely 
warranted,11 it did set the groundwork for an eventual Jewish majority. 
After 1948, the new Israeli government encouraged mass immigration 
from across the globe and by 1951, there was a Jewish majority. In this 
period, Israel was confronted with even greater demographic challenges 
than before; the task was no longer how to create a Jewish majority, but 
how to keep it.  
 
Keeping Israel Jewish 
Creating Facts on the Ground 
 
Before 1967, it was possible for Israel to simply avoid dealing with the 
refugee situation it had created. The West Bank and Gaza were 
separately administered by Jordan and Egypt, respectively, and the 
thousands of Palestinian refugees posed no immediate demographic 
threat to Israel. Israel was unwilling to cede any of the land it had 
seized during the 1948 war and accorded Palestinian refugees 
                                       
11
 Weizmann had been one of the most rigorous promoters of Arab transfer immediately 
prior to 1948, canvassing support across Europe and the United States (See Masalha, 
1992: 127). 
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indeterminate status until peace was secured with the surrounding Arab 
states. To ensure Israeli hegemony over newly captured land, Jewish 
settlements immediately began to spring up across the Negev. The idea 
was to discourage U.N. insistence of a return to the 1947 partition 
borders by creating fait accompli “facts on the ground.” Immediately 
following the Palestinian exodus, Ezra Danin, a member of the 
Yishuv’s Committee for Abandoned Arab Property stated, “if we do 
not seek to encourage the return of the Arabs … then they must be 
confronted with fait accomplis” (Danin cited in Morris, 1987: 135). 
Such plans, according to Danin, included the destruction of Arab 
houses, the expedient resettling of Jews on the evacuated land and the 
expropriation of Arab property (Morris, 1987: 135). Though Danin 
resigned from the Committee for Abandoned Arab Property for his 
inability to curb Jewish looting, he formed a self-appointed “Transfer 
Committee” with Yosef Weitz, the director of the Jewish National 
Fund’s Land Department. Together they issued a short memorandum, 
intended for Ben-Gurion’s approval, entitled “Retroactive Transfer: A 
Scheme For the Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel” 
(Morris, 1990: 104). The scheme acknowledged that a post-war “Israel 
must be inhabited largely by Jews, so that there will be in it very few 
non-Jews” and that “the uprooting of the Arabs should be seen as the 
solution to the Arab question” (Morris, 1990: 104). 
 
Although the temporary “Transfer Committee” was not permitted to 
operate officially as a branch of government, Ben-Gurion approved to 
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the plan (Morris, 1990: 107). The Yishuv began to carry out systematic 
village destruction followed by prompt Jewish settlement—a strategy 
complimented by an intense propaganda campaign against Arab hopes 
of return. Indeed, Jewish forces destroyed hundreds of Arab villages 
between 1948-1949 and the Yishuv actively encouraged Jewish 
settlement, in most cases literally on top of Palestinian ruins. Such 
tactics proved extremely useful at discouraging Palestinian hopes for 
return. Because the retroactive transfer policies began in June 1948, 
after the majority of refugees had already fled or been expelled, the 
purely political motives were well known (Morris, 1990: 107). This 
realization sparked some minor opposition from the Israeli left, but Ben 
Gurion’s complicity in the demolitions was not well known and the 
policies were passively accepted as the natural fulfilment of Zionist 
demographic goals. When village destruction eventually became 
politically untenable, Yosef Weitz turned to purchasing land from Arab 
tenants. Interestingly, he consulted with Moshe Shertok, expressing his 
concern that some of the money paid to Arab farmers might be used to 
finance the Arab war-effort. Shertok’s response was clear, “The reasons 
for buying [Arab land] outweigh [the reasons against]” (Shertok cited 
in Morris, 1990: 123). Such a statement merely underscores the 
importance of demography as a higher priority even than Israel’s 
immediate security concerns. 
 
The Arabs remaining in Israel after 1948 (about 170,000 in 1950) were 
“regarded as potential fifth columnists” and were “subject to Israel’s 
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perceived security requirements and the needs of its incoming settlers” 
(Smith, 2004: 220). Despite the unsure status of the refugees and 
notwithstanding the rights of Israeli Arabs, Israel began to classify 
much Arab land as “absentee”—a condition under which the Israeli 
government was able to seize property even if the owner had merely 
left town for a single day on or after November 29, 1947. This practice 
served to provide housing for the massive influx of immigrants Israel 
experienced during the late 1940s and further discouraged Arab hopes 
for return. Israel was also able to avoid confronting the demographic 
problem by offering several lukewarm peace proposals, with provisions 
known to be unacceptable to Arab leaders, but which afforded Israel a 
positive image. Such proposals were made at the behest of the 
international community, however, and none were seriously pursued. It 
was essential to maintain this “no-peace, no-war” relationship with 
Israel’s Arab neighbors as any serious peace deal would inevitably 
have required Israel to address the refugees’ status. Such a tentative, 
inherently temporary, situation remained in effect until the six-day war 
of 1967. 
 
The Occupation Begins 
 
Historians recognize the embarrassing Arab defeat of 1967 as an event 
of central importance for the region, leading to the codification of 
Palestinian national identity among other indirect implications. Perhaps 
of equal or greater importance for the region, the war’s aftermath ended 
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with Israeli control of Gaza and the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem. The Israeli occupation began in full force and demography 
suddenly arrived at the forefront of Israeli politics. Indeed, the 
demography of the newly occupied territories was tantamount to a 
Zionist nightmare; for Israel to have simply absorbed the Palestinian 
Arab population as Israeli citizens would have effectively reversed the 
Jewish majority. Many were concerned about Yasser Arafat’s 
description of a “biological time-bomb which threatens to blow up 
Israel from within … [The Israelis] fear our children and the Palestinian 
women who give birth to another child every 10 months” (Arafat cited 
in Ben-Meir, 1993). Thus, when Israel immediately declared the 1949 
armistice borders to be invalid and assumed control of the territories, 
Israeli citizenship was denied to West Bank residents (Smith, 2004: 
293). Within weeks of the war, Israeli citizens began to settle in the 
West Bank, Gaza and even southern Syria “to ‘create facts’ to establish 
a Jewish presence that would become inalienable, thereby negating 
future calls for a compromise” (Smith, 2004: 295). This pattern of 
settlement has been repeated throughout Israeli history, a policy linked 
with the uncertain knowledge that Israel might one day have to 
relinquish control over some of the conquered land. The sheer 
longevity of the conflict has secured a significant foothold for the 
settlements, making withdrawal all the more difficult. Even when one 
considers the ramifications of Israel’s 2005 unilateral disengagement 
from the Gaza Strip, most of the settlers uprooted there were simply 
offered land in the West Bank and financial compensation as 
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recompense. Moreover, late into U.S. President Bill Clinton began to 
refer to East Jerusalem as “disputed”—an almost complete reversal of 
previous U.S. discourse—after considering the now decades-old Israeli 
settlements around the city (Smith, 2004: 442). Even United Nations 
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, addressing a crowd in East Jerusalem 
recently, angered Palestinians by expressing his joy at being in “Israel”. 
 
Since 1967, Jewish settlements in the West Bank have cut to the very 
heart of Zionist thought, fulfilling both the demographic and Greater 
Israel principles. In direct contradiction of international law, the Israeli 
interior ministry officially recognizes and supports the settlements, 
granting settlers full Israeli rights, including military protection.12 
According to B’Tselem, “Israel forbids Palestinians to enter and use 
these lands [occupied by settlers], and uses the settlements to justify 
numerous violations of Palestinian rights, such as the right to housing, 
to gain a living, and freedom of movement” (B’Tselem, 2006a). 
Because of this, Israel’s policy of establishing “facts on the ground” 
has proven to be the most effective way to discourage the return of 
Palestinian refugees and to avoid addressing the final status of the 
occupied territories.13 Furthermore, Israel views all Palestinian 
                                       
12
 As of January 2008, there were 122 Jewish settlements in the West Bank, an increase 
of more than 20 new settlements in the decade after the 1993 Oslo Accords. 48 of these 
settlements are on the Palestinian side of the WBB (Aronson, 2008: 168). 
13
 One should also note that settlement expansion often occurs at strategic moments 
during Israel-Palestinian negotiations. During the 2007 Annapolis Summit and in the 
months following, Israel announced the construction of hundreds of new settlement 
housing units. 
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residents of the West Bank as potential terrorists and has established a 
dual system of laws, which are applied according to ethnic and 
religious background. Because Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank are 
ineligible for Israeli citizenship, Israel has established a veritable 
“separation cum discrimination regime” replete with “Israeli-only” 
roads and other segregated public utilities (B’Tselem, 2006a). Such a 
hierarchical distinction between West Bank Palestinians and Israeli 
settlers has naturally served to benefit those of superior legal status, e.g. 
Palestinian attacks against settlers are harshly rebuked by the IDF, 
often resulting in military strikes and mass detentions. Conversely, it is 
normal for attacks against Palestinians to either be ignored or result in 
only light punishment for the perpetrators. Until February 2005, the 
IDF practiced a policy of collective punishment in demolishing 
Palestinian houses, despite the internal and international outcry. The 
IDF justified such destruction as punishment for houses built without a 
construction permit yet “Israeli officials enforce the rules in a 
discriminatory manner, strictly denying construction permits for 
Palestinian homes while allowing the construction of Israeli settlements 
to proceed” (United Nations, 2003: 158). I conjecture that the massive 
military, financial, and civic burden of the settlements has been 
measured against the ideology of Zionism, its expansionist principles, 
and the resulting demographic benefits of settlement. Similar to the 
purchasing of Arab land following the 1948 war, it seems demography 
supersedes security. The ongoing encouragement of settlement by the 
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Israeli government against international (including American14) 
protestation stresses this point. Since 1967, Israel has continued to 
create fait accomplis aimed at preventing withdrawal and avoiding 
demographic compromise. 
THE INTIFADA 
 
For two decades after 1967, Israel was able to maintain the occupation 
of the West Bank and Gaza without any major difficulties. By all 
accounts, economic growth in the territories was not seriously affected 
before Menachem Begin brought Likud to power in the late 1970s; 
thus, Palestinian life under occupation began without widespread 
discontent. Israel’s policies toward the demographic problem changed 
after the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Still refusing to absorb the occupied 
Palestinian population as citizens, more emphasis was placed upon 
Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. Likud oversaw an 
explosion of Israeli settlement—800 individuals annually increased to 
over 6,000—and the settlements themselves began to be tactically 
established in close proximity to Arab villages.   
 
In 1987, the ephemeral nature of this situation became clear as tensions 
boiled over and Israel witnessed the angry emergence of a Palestinian 
generation born and raised under Israeli dominance. The disastrous 
“break their bones” response to the stone-throwing tactics of the first 
                                       
14
 See the Roadmap to Peace and the stipulations regarding Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank (United States, 2003). 
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Intifada brought about a need for Israel to maintain control militarily, 
while allowing a degree of Palestinian autonomy. In May 1989, Israeli 
Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir moved to grant “free and democratic 
elections” (Shamir cited in Smith, 2004: 412) to the Palestinian Arabs 
of the occupied territories. The plan was transparent in its intentions to 
maintain Israeli control of the occupied territories and was summarily 
rejected by the PLO. Likewise, conservative Israelis viewed the plan as 
an obvious precursor to a Palestinian state and also rejected it. The 
familiar themes of geography and demography continued to 
overshadow events until the peace process, beginning with the Madrid 
Talks, commenced (see Smith, 2004).  
 
The diplomatic successes of the Madrid Talks (October 1991 – 
Summer 1993) were limited as the parties faced a stalemate in 
negotiations. Shamir’s plan, as he self-admittedly stated upon leaving 
office in 1992, “was to drag out the talks on Palestinian self-rule for 10 
years while attempting to settle hundreds of thousands of Jews in the 
occupied territories” (Hoffman, 1992). In this way, the peace process 
began by serving three immediate needs for Israel: it stalled the 
Intifada, changed Israel’s international image from occupying power to 
peacemaker and “gave the appearance of accommodation while 
working to ensure Israeli retention of the territories” (Smith, 2004: 
419).  
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When Yitzhak Rabin became Prime Minister in 1992, Israeli settlement 
of the West Bank continued, albeit less intensely, while much attention 
shifted to so-called “land for peace” deals. During the signing of the 
Oslo Accords, the principle of “land for peace” was resurrected which, 
although having been around for a while,15 became a practical option. 
However, the provisions in Oslo I enabled a system similar to Yitzhak 
Shamir’s 1989 proposal: Palestinian autonomy under Israeli control and 
without a final status in sight. The A and B Zones of Oslo II called for 
limited Palestinian autonomy, while the C Zone (comprising Israeli 
settlements, military installations and border areas) was reserved for 
total Israeli control until the eventual final status negotiations. This 
“enabled Israel ‘not to freeze building and natural growth’ in the 
settlements, meaning existing settlements could be expanded to absorb 
more land” (Smith, 2004: 450). Thus, the very structure of Oslo I and II 
was unstable. It is clear that Rabin was concerned primarily with Oslo’s 
prospects for ridding Israel of 90% of the West Bank’s Arab 
population, while only ceding 30% of the land. In this way, it seemed 
possible to diffuse the demographic “bomb” without having to pay 
much for it. Thus, Rabin’s land for peace was framed around 
demographic concerns and constitutes yet another example of 
demography eclipsing security.  
 
An economic agreement was also signed as part of Oslo II—the Paris 
Protocol—which stipulated Israeli control of import taxes on goods 
                                       
15
 See UN Security Council Resolution 242 
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entering the Palestinian Authority’s domain and brought the occupied 
territories under the domain of the New Israeli Shekel (NIS). 
Palestinian economic independence was not an outcome Israel could 
accept, as it would have “creat[ed] a binding precedent on the eve of 
the final status stage” by giving the “flavor of sovereignty” (B’Tselem, 
2006b). Incidentally, the continued employment of Palestinian laborers 
in Israel was made conditional upon the Palestinian Authority’s 
acceptance of the Paris Protocol.16 Yet, the Oslo negotiations came to a 
stalemate. In 1994, Rabin, who had anticipated such an outcome, 
remarked that Israel would “have to decide on separation as a 
philosophy” (Rabin cited in Makovsky, 2004: 52), implying a physical 
barrier. Before his 1995 assassination, Rabin oversaw the construction 
of the Gaza Strip Barrier. Any similar plans to physically separate the 
West Bank (if considered at all) were postponed until after Benjamin 
Netanyahu came to power, froze the peace process and solidified Israeli 
control of Zone C.  
THE WBB 
 
When the 2000 Summit at Camp David ended in failure and Palestinian 
frustration exploded into the second Intifada, Rabin’s idea of separation 
was revived and quickly led to the WBB. By far the boldest (and most 
expensive) operation ever undertaken by Israel in its quest to create 
“facts on the ground,” the barrier is the modern manifestation of 
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 The economic integration of the West Bank has never been a source of major 
controversy, when compared to the political integration of West Bank individuals. 
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Zionism’s demographic imperative. It has caused the direct 
displacement of thousands of Palestinian Arabs and led thousands more 
to abandon their lands. Those caught between the Green Line and the 
WBB have been stripped of their property, further preparing sections of 
the West Bank for Israeli settlement.17 The WBB has effectively 
annexed approximately 10% of the West Bank, including some of the 
most fertile areas and because the barrier has been built on the 
Palestinian side of the Green Line, it has caused untold hardship to 
thousands of Palestinian Arabs (Chomsky, 2006; Pappe, 2006). In some 
cases, the High Court of Israel has ordered some sections of the 
Barrier’s path to be rebuilt in a less intrusive manner, but considering 
the finances Israel has spent in its effort to include as many Israeli 
settlements as possible on the Israeli side of the Green Line, it seems 
the Barrier is intended for long term use. Before his invasion of 
Lebanon during the summer of 2006, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert spoke often of his “convergence plan” to unilaterally draw 
Israel’s permanent borders along the WBB, permanently annexing large 
portions of Palestine to Israel and confirming Palestinian fears from the 
beginning (Heller, 2006). Demography was the chief concern 
governing the WBB’s construction, a suggestion more easy understood 
when understanding the importance of demography to Zionism. 
                                       
17
 It is interesting to consider the thousands of Palestinians caught along the seam-line 
between Israel and the WBB; there are no plans to absorb them as Israeli citizens despite 
the recent talk of drawing Israel’s permanent borders along the WBB. The future legal 
status of these people is unclear. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This article has attempted to convey the importance of demography to 
Zionist thought. As a nationalist ideology, Zionism has adopted 
inevitable paradoxes. For example, although Zionism required the 
removal of Palestine’s native population to establish a Jewish majority, 
it needed to simultaneously forget such an unpleasant version of that 
history. Likewise, Israeli policies of village destruction, crop poisoning, 
and Jewish settlement on top of abandoned Arab villages were 
sugarcoated as “miraculous.” Moreover, from 1967 until today, the 
presence of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories has served to 
undermine the possibility of withdrawal. The occupation and the 
lengthy, limited benefits of the peace talks have further suspended 
discussion of refugee status; the pattern of avoidance continues today 
with the WBB, though in more serious terms. The most extreme aspects 
of the occupation have culminated in a physical barrier separating two 
peoples. Though also a potential deterrent to Palestinian militancy, the 
long-term implications of the WBB have primarily served to protect 
and expand Israel’s Jewish majority, fulfilling the principles of Zionism 
by maximizing Jewish control over as much of Palestine as possible. 
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